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Ninesling v. Nassau County Department of Social
Services: Awarding Custody of a Foster Child
Surrendered for Adoption
The New York courts have maintained' that "the best inter-
est[s] of . .. children must govern in the adjudication of cus-
tody."'2 In the recent case of Ninesling v. Nassau County De-
partment of Social Services, foster parents unsuccessfully
sought to win legal custody of a foster child surrendered for
adoption by his natural parent. The New York Court of Appeals
claimed to be fulfilling its duty of awarding custody based on
the best interests of the child while it also claimed to be consid-
ering the "future viability" of the foster case system.4 The ap-
proach adopted by the court, however, actually subordinated the
court's asserted duty of awarding custody on the basis of best
interests to the court's concern for the preservation of the foster
care system.
The pertinent facts of Ninesling follow: the Nassau County
Department of Social Services certified Joseph and Betty
Ninesling as foster parents and placed a four-day old infant,
Chuck F., in their temporary care, expressly reserving the right
to remove the child upon notification.5 Less than four months
later, the Department informed the Nineslings that Chuck's nat-
ural mother had surrendered him for adoption and that he
would be removed from the foster home and permanently placed
with an adoptive family.6 The identity of the prospective adop-
1. See note 51 and accompanying text infra (discussing best interests as controlling
custody award in New York) and notes 137-39 and accompanying text infra (discussing
court's duty to award custody based on best interests of the child).
2. Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 246, 372 N.E.2d 4, 5, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169
(1977).
3. 46 N.Y.2d 382, 386 N.E.2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1978).
4. Id. at 389, 386 N.E.2d at 237, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 628. See notes 128-39 and accom-
panying text infra.
5. Brief for Respondent at 14, Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46
N.Y.2d 382, 386 N.E.2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1978).
6. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 386
N.E.2d 235, 237, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (1978). The Department refused to disclose to
the Nineslings the standards for eligibility as adoptive parents, grant the Nineslings a
study of their suitability as adoptive parents, or allow the Nineslings to apply to adopt
Chuck. Brief for Appellant on Motion for Reargument at 4-5, Ninesling v. Nassau
County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 386 N.E.2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1978).
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tive family was not revealed.' The Department refused to grant
the Nineslings permission to adopt the child and served them
with formal notice of removal.8 The New York Supreme Court
denied the Nineslings' application for a writ of habeas corpus.'
The Department had investigated the Nineslings' suitability as foster parents before
Chuck was placed in their care. 46 N.Y.2d at 387, 386 N.E.2d at 238, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
629. The Department had also previously placed four other children with the Nineslings
for foster care, id. at 385, 386 N.E.2d at 237, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 628, and had presented
them with an award for their foster care service. Brief for Appellant on Motion for Rear-
gument at 4, Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 386
N.E.2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1978).
7. Discussion with Brian C. Baker, Attorney for the Nineslings, in New York (Jan. 9,
1980). This fact does not appear in the court of appeals decision.
8. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 385-86, 386
N.E.2d 235, 237, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (1978). The statutory review-mechanism provides
for an administrative "fair hearing" on request. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 400 (McKinney
1976) (current version at N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 22, 400 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980)).
Unless the foster parent has continuously cared for the child for a period of at least
eighteen months, such hearing is held after removal of the child. See N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Judicial review is then available through an
Article 78 proceeding. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1976). This statu-
tory review procedure has been determined not to violate due process, although the
United States Supreme Court has not determined whether foster parents or foster chil-
dren have a liberty or property interest of constitutional magnitude in their relationship.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
See generally Note, Constitutional Protection of Long-Term Foster Families, 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 1191 (1979).
By employing a habeas corpus proceeding, the Nineslings bypassed the statutory
review mechanism and retained the child pending appeal. Their de facto custody was
continued throughout the proceedings by judicial stays. Some foster parents using the
statutory mechanism have also obtained judicial stays which enabled them to retain fos-
ter children pending the exhaustion of administrative and judicial remedies. See, e.g., In
re Denise W., 77 Misc. 2d 374, 355 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1974). See also
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 830 n.
27, 832 n. 32 (1977). The court of appeals stated that a habeas corpus proceeding was
inappropriate because the statutory mechanism was ignored and because the Nineslings
had retained de facto custody of the child. Instead, the court of appeals treated the
proceeding as an Article 78 proceeding. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social
Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 387, 386 N.E.2d 235, 238, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 629 (1978). The court
of appeals did not permit the Nineslings to base a claim for statutory adoption prefer-
ence on judicially permitted retention of the child. See notes 119-27 and accompanying
text infra. Pre-Christmas media coverage followed the court of appeals decision; both the
publicity and the prolonged retention of Chuck were undoubtedly critical factors in the
Department's decision then to change its position and consent to the Nineslings' adop-
tion of Chuck. See N.Y. Post, Dec. 23, 1978, at 1.
9. The supreme court first mandated an administrative fair hearing, in accordance
with N.Y. Soc. SEsv. LAW § 400 (McKinney 1976). Following the hearing, the Social
Services Commissioner upheld the departmental decision to remove Chuck as in the best
interests of the child. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382,
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The court determined that removal from the foster parents' care
would not cause the child "permanent detrimental harm." 10 On
that basis, the supreme court affirmed the Department's deci-
sion that removal would serve the best interests of the child.11
The decision to remove Chuck was affirmed by the appellate di-
visionI2 and the court of appeals." At the time of the court of
appeals decision, Chuck had been in the Nineslings' continuous
care for a period of over two years."
The court of appeals considered two questions. First, what
burden must foster parents meet to win custody of a child who
has been surrendered for adoption? The court held that foster
parents must meet a "detrimental impact" standard by showing
"not only that they would make suitable adoptive parents, but,
rather, that they would provide a better adoptive home than
that planned by the department;" as noted by the court, this is
a "virtually impossible" burden.15 Second, did the Nineslings
qualify for the statutory adoption preference 6 afforded foster
parents who have continuously cared for a child for two years?
The court of appeals held that the Nineslings did not qualify for
the preference; the Department's initial notice of removal was
received only four months after the child came into their care,
386, 386 N.E.2d 235, 237, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (1978). After holding its own supple-
mental judicial hearing, the supreme court denied the habeas corpus application.
Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 7810-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau
County, Nov. 28, 1977).
10. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 7810-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nassau County, Nov. 28, 1977). See note 69 infra (discussing the supreme court opinion).
Cf. note 55 and accompanying text infra (discussing linguistic differences in "best inter-
ests" test). See generally notes 51-58 and accompanying text infra (discussing "best in-
terests of the child").
11. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 7810-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nassau County, Nov. 28, 1977).
12. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 61 A.D.2d 1053, 403 N.Y.S.2d
1022 (2d Dep't 1978) (mem.).
13. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 386 N.E.2d
235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1978).
14. Id. at 391, 386 N.E.2d at 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 389-91, 386 N.E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 631. All the judges agreed with
the detrimental impact standard stated by Judge Jasen in the majority opinion; however,
Judges Wachtler, Gabrielli, and Fuchsberg dissented on the disposition of the case. Id. at
391-93, 386 N.E.2d at 240-41, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33.
16. The period of continuous care required to qualify for the statutory preference
was changed to eighteen months, effective October 9, 1979. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 383(3)




and subsequent delays were caused by the Nineslings' reluctance
to give up the child.17 In answering both of these questions, the
court emphasized the importance of preserving the viability of
the foster care system.18
Part I of this note examines the foster care system. Part II
explores the "best interests of the child" standard as the basis
for awarding custody of a child in New York. Part III sets forth
the reasoning of the court of appeals in Ninesling, and Part IV
critically analyzes this reasoning. In evaluating the court's rea-
soning, the note concludes that no sound basis exists for placing
either a heavy or a virtually impossible burden of proof upon
foster parents opposing a department for custody of a surren-
dered child; that the court might have applied the statutory
adoption preference to the Nineslings; and that the court's pri-
mary responsibility is to award custody based on the best inter-
ests of the child, even if such award endangers the foster care
system.
I. Foster Care
Surveys indicate that over half a million American children
are growing up outside of the homes of their natural parents and
under the responsibility of public child care systems.10 Children
may be placed temporarily in public child care systems while
families are unable to care for their children, or while children
are being freed for adoption and suitable adoptive homes are be-
ing sought.2 0 Foster care provides for a child's physical needs in
a temporary family setting that will contribute to the child's
healthy psychological development.2 If foster care were not
available, many of these children might be relegated to institu-
17. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d at 390, 386 N.E.2d
at 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 631. Judge Wachtler, joined in his dissent by Judge Gabrielli,
and Judge Fuchsberg, in a separate dissenting opinion, would have awarded custody to
the foster parents because of the overriding concern for the best interests of the child
whose foster care had been prolonged beyond two years. Id. at 391-93, 386 N.E.2d at
240-41, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33 (dissenting opinions).
18. Id. at 388-89, 386 N-E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
19. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHLDREN WITHOUT HOMES 1-2 (1978). See generally
III R. BREMM-R, CHILDREN & YOUTH IN AMERMA 634-77 (1974).
20. See Note, Constitutional Protection of Long-Term Foster Families, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1191 (1979).
21. See generally Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283 (1971).
[Vol. 1:247
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tional temporary care.2
In New York, foster parents are licensed by a New York
State social services commissioner or certified by a state-author-
ized private agency.23 Foster parents provide care for children on
a compensated, contractual, and temporary basis.2 4 While the
foster parents care for the child, the department or agency has
legal custody of the child2 5 as well as the right to remove the
child from the foster home.26 Foster parents who have continu-
ously cared for a child for the required period of time have the
statutory right to apply to adopt the child and to intervene in
any custody proceeding involving the child. They also receive
"preference and first consideration" over other applicants seek-
ing to adopt the foster child.2
22. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 2, 45-46 (1978). See
generally Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283 (1971).
23. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 375-376 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. Soc. SRv. LAW § 377
(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). See generally Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 823-38 (1977) (description of New York foster care
system).
24. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 824-26 (1977). See also N.Y. Soc. SREv. LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
25. N.Y. Soc. Smv. LAW § 383(2) (McKinney 1976).
26. Typically, the department or agency will reserve an express contractual right to
remove the child on notice. The right to remove, however, is also reserved by statute:
"[sluch authorized agency may in its discretion remove such child from the home where
placed or boarded." Id.
27. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). In 1979, the re-
quired period of continuous care was changed from two years to eighteen months. Id.
28. The statute creating the preference provides:
Any adult husband and his adult wife and any adult unmarried person, who,
as foster* parent or parents, have cared for a child continuously for a period of
eighteen months or more, may apply to such authorized agency for the placement
of said child with them for the purpose of adoption, and if said child is eligible for
adoption, the agency shall give preference and first consideration to their applica-
tion over all other applications for adoption placements. However, final determi-
nation of the propriety of said adoption of such foster child shall be within the
sole discretion of the court, as otherwise provided herein.
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Some affirmative action to
claim an adoption preference is required; a timely, formal application, however, is appar-
ently not necessary. See Andrews v. Beaudoin, 39 A.D.2d 1005, 1006, 333 N.Y.S.2d 717,
719 (3rd Dep't 1972) (dictum); In re Dionisio R., 81 Misc. 2d 436, 442-43, 366 N.Y.S.2d
280, 287-88 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (dictum).
Following several well-publicized cases in which foster children were removed from
foster homes, the legislature enacted several provisions benefiting foster parents. These
legislative actions have been variously attributed as responses to Scarpetta v. Spence-
Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (natural mother
1980]
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A department or agency investigates the qualifications of
those persons seeking to become foster or adoptive parents.2 9
Foster parents care for the child in a stable family setting for a
temporary period of time; the adoptive relationship is perma-
nent. To reflect these different functions within the child care
system, the criteria for assessing eligibility are applied differ-
ently to the two types of prospective parents.8 0 Such criteria as
age, financial means, and similarity of race and religion to that
of the natural parent are less rigorously applied to proposed fos-
ter parents than to proposed adoptive parents.31
Commentators have criticized the foster care system. 2 Al-
though the system is designed to provide only temporary care,
most foster children are neither adopted nor returned to their
natural homes; instead, many foster children are retained within
the foster care system for more than a "temporary" period of
time, and some are shifted from one foster home to another. 3
The foster care system also tends to isolate children from their
can revoke surrender of child at discretion of court), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 805
(1971); In re Jewish Child Care Assn., 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1959) (in order to place child in second foster home for eventual return to natural
mother, agency can remove child from loving foster parents who want to adopt); and
Fitzsimmons v. Liuni, 51 Misc. 2d 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Family Ct. Ulster County)
(commissioner can remove child from foster home for placement with unknown adoptive
parents where court independently finds it in best interests of child), rev'd on other
grounds, 26 A.D.2d 980, 274 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep't 1966). These attributions were made
respectively in In re Dionisio R., 81 Misc. 2d 436, 439, 366 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284-85 (Family
Ct. N.Y. County 1975); In re Ida Denise W., 77 Misc. 2d 374, 374, 355 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247
(Family Ct. N.Y. County 1974); and Foster & Freed, Family Law, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV.
478, 479 (1967).
29. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 374, 377 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
30. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 388, 386
N.E.2d 235, 238, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1978); Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29
N.Y.2d 196, 204, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 944 (1971).
31. Id.
32. See generally CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES (1978);
Mnookin, Foster Care - In Whose Best Interests? in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 158
(1974); Foster & Freed, Children and the Law, 1966 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 649.
33. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
829 (1977); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 3 n. 7 (1978);
Mnookin, Foster Care - In Whose Best Interests? in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 158, 171
(1974). One statistical survey revealed that over 52% of foster children studied had been
in foster care for more than two years and 33% from four to six years; 56% of the foster
children had each been in more than one foster home. Id. at 187. This tendency to retain
foster children within the foster system may be reduced by New York's recent institution
of periodic judicial review of foster care and adoption subsidies. Id. at 161.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/8
NINESLING V. NASSAU COUNTY
natural families: inadequate efforts are made to prevent the ini-
tial need to remove children from their natural parents; insuffi-
cient consideration is given to placing children within the ex-
tended family; insufficient encouragement is given for natural
parents to visit their children once the children are placed in
foster care.3 4 Further, the foster care bureaucracy has been at-
tacked for allegedly arbitrary application of placement criteria.38
Criticism of the system, however, must be balanced against
an understanding of the positive ends foster care seeks to serve
and the consideration that institutional care may be the only
practical alternative to the present system.3 6 The underlying
facts of Ninesling, rather than demonstrating the faults of the
system, demonstrate that the system can perform well. Within
four months, Chuck was placed in a foster home and surren-
dered for adoption. In that short time, the Department also
found a permanent adoptive home for him.
II. Awarding Custody on The Basis Of The
"Best Interests Of The Child" Standard
At common law, a father had a "parental right" to the cus-
tody of his child based upon the father's duty to support the
child37 and upon his property right in the services and earnings
34. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 5, 192-94 (1978). Recent
statutory enactments, which post-date Ninesling, require agencies and departments to
provide preventive services. See N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAW §§ 398, 398-b, 409-b, 409-e (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1979-1980). Additional state funds are also being allocated to preventive
services. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1979, at B3, col. 5.
35. See Foster & Freed, Children and the Law, 1966 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 649,
660-61. See generally Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 833-38 (1977); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN WrrIHouT HOMES
(1978).
Foster care systems have also been accused of discriminatory treatment of minori-
ties. Minorities are overrepresented in the child care system and underrepresented in
permanent placements compared to their proportion in the population as a whole. Id. at
49-51.
36. Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 285 (1971).
37. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMIucAN LAW 192 (12th ed. O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed.
1873) (father entitled to custody "[i]n consequence of the obligation of the father to
provide for the maintenance and, in some qualified degree, for the education of his in-
fant children"); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434, 440 (parents given authority
over their children to enable the parents to more effectively perform their duty of main-
tenance, protection, and education, and to recompense parents for discharging this
duty); Bronson, Custody on Appeal, 10 LAW & CONTEM. PROB. 737, 740 (1944).
19801
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of the child." The decline of "parental right" paralleled, and has
been attributed to, the development in feudal England of the
doctrine of parens patriae.s9 Under this doctrine, the Crown as-
sumed jurisdiction over the estates of minors; later it acquired
the prerogative of "ultimate parent" of all children, with the
power to protect their welfare and determine their custody.40
Subsequently, this power was delegated by the Crown to the
chancellor. 1 It finally passed to the chancellor's successor, the
courts of equity.42
Parens patriae, as it developed in English custody deci-
sions, involved a determination of the child's welfare in the ful-
lest sense of the term, including moral, religious, and physical
well-being, as well as ties of affection."' "The Court has to con-
sider . . . the whole of the circumstances of the case, the posi-
tion of the parent, the position of the child, the age of the child,
the religion of the child so far as it can be said to have any relig-
38. See Katz, Who Looks After Laura? in THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 48,
52-53 (1977) (father's property right in the child could be sold or transferred). Cf. Wai-
ters v. Davies, 143 Misc. 759, 761, 257 N.Y.S. 118, 121 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County 1932)
(modern view that parent has no proprietary right to custody since child is no longer
chattel of parent); 2 J. KENT, supra note 37, at 193 n.b. (father has a right to child's
services or to their value if rendered to a third person; both custody and property right
are a consequence of father's duty to support child); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at
441 (father "may indeed have the benefit of his [minor] children's labour while they live
with him, and are maintained by him").
39. See Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involv-
ing Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 155 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives]; Com-
ment, Determination of Custody Between Welfare Agency and Foster Parents, 34
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1323, 1323 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Determination].
40. See Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsburg, 2 P. Wms. 103, 119, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664
(Ch. 1722). Parens patriae encompassed the care and protection of "charities, idiots,
lunatics, and infants." Id. See also note 39 supra.
41. See Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsburg, 2 P. Wins. 103, 118, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 666
(Ch. 1722); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 432-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (Cardozo, J.).
42. See Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
43. Queen v. Gyngall, [1893] 2 Q.B. 232, 243 (C.A.). This case involved a fifteen-
year-old girl who had been separated from her Roman Catholic mother for long periods
of time while the mother attempted to earn her livelihood as a maid and dressmaker.
The child, who was happily living with Protestant persons, had adopted their religion
and did not wish to return to her mother. The court affirmed the denial of the mother's
habeas corpus application for custody of the child, determining that this decision was
essential for the welfare of the child. Id.
Although decided too late to be part of New York common law by reception, the
latter case is repeatedly cited by the New York Court of Appeals in Finlay v. Finlay, 240
N.Y. 429, 432-34, 148 N.E. 624, 625-26 (1925).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/8
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ion, and the happiness of the child."""
The New York Constitution vests the state supreme court
with general original jurisdiction in equity as well as in law. 5 As
a court of equity, the supreme court can exercise parens patriae
jurisdiction 46 to protect a child by acting as a "wise, affectionate
and careful parent"47 would act for the welfare of the child. In
order to benefit the child, the court will, "in a proper case,"' '4
supersede or suspend the legal rights of parties contending for
custody"9 and will "do what is best for the interest of the
child."50
In New York, "the paramount concern in all custody mat-
ters [is] . . . the best interest[s] of the child."5' This standard
is set forth both in case law,5 2 and in various provisions of the
Domestic Relations and Social Services Laws.5 3 In awarding cus-
44. Queen v. Gyngall, [18931 2 Q.B. 232, 243 (C.A.).
45. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 7.
46. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 575, 578-79 (1856).
47. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (Cardozo, J.) (quot-
ing Queen v. Gyngall, [1893] 2 Q.B. 232, 241 (C.A.)).
48. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 575, 578 (1856).
49. Id. See Queen v. Gyngall, [1893] 2 Q.B. 232, 242 (C.A.) (court can interfere with
legal rights if "clearly right" for the welfare of the child "in the widest sense" of the
word).
50. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (Cardozo, J.).
51. Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172
(1977). See Cusano v. Leone, 43 N.Y.2d 665, 371 N.E.2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1977);
Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976); Spence-
Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971).
But see Convent of the Sisters of Mercy v. Barbieri, 200 Misc. 112, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1950) (although contrary to best interests of this child, agency may
retain custody to protect placement and adoption program).
52. See note 51 supra. "Extraordinary circumstances" must be found before the
"best interests of the child" test is "trigger[ed]" in a custody contest between a natural
parent and a non-parent. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283,
387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (1976). This requirement, however, does not negate the test of
"best interests." Instead, it employs the "best interest" test while recognizing the exis-
tence of a rebuttable presumption that a child's best interest will be served by awarding
custody to the natural parent. Id. at 547-48, 356 N.E.2d at 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826. See
notes 59-66 and accompanying text infra (discussing parental presumption).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1977) (in habeas corpus proceed-
ing for child detained by parent, "court shall determine solely what is for the best inter-
ests of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award
[of custody] accordingly"); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1977) (custody in mat-
rimonial action is awarded "having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the
respective parties and to the best interests of the child"); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(5)
(McKinney 1976) (if natural parents seek to regain custody after child surrendered for
1980]
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tody based upon the "best interests of the child," New York
courts consider a multitude of different factors such as the cus-
todian's moral fitness, financial means, race, and religion; emo-
tional ties and continuity of relationships between the child and
the custodian; and the child's wishes, age, sex, and health." Dif-
ficulties in predicting what will serve the child's best interests
and in applying the best interests test have been recognized, and
the doctrine has been disparaged as uncertain, unworkable, sub-
jective,58 and a "mere cloak for judicial intuition."" Commenta-
tors have criticized courts for failing to consider sufficiently the
child's psychological well-being in determining best interests. 7
adoption, "custody of such child shall be awarded solely on the basis of the best interests
of the child, and there shall be no presumption that such interests will be promoted by
any particular custodial disposition").
54. See, e.g., Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977)
(mother abducted children); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976) (long separation, unwed mother, no established home, child at-
tached to custodian); In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959) (boarding parents overly possessive, emotionally involved); Bunim v.
Bunim, 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949) (mother adulterer and perjurer, father suc-
cessful physician). See generally Alternatives, supra note 39, at 153.
55. See Alternatives, supra note 39, at 153-54; Rodham, Children Under the Law,
in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1, 27 (1974) ("best interests standard . . . not properly a
standard ... [but] a rationalization by decision-makers justifying their judgments about
a child's future, like an empty vessel into which adult perceptions and prejudices are
poured"); Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 167, 206-07 (1969) (best interest standard poses insoluble problems of pre-
diction and judgment). Cf. Mnookin, Foster Care - In Whose Best Interest? in THE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, 158, 177 (1974) (noting some of the various values that may be
used in determining best interests: stability, happiness, intellectual stimulation, eco-
nomic productivity, short or long term interests, spiritual goodness). New York courts
have examined best interests, see Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196,
274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971); ultimate best interests, see Nehra v. Uhlar, 43
N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977); and long range best interests, see
Alan D.M. v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 58 A.D.2d 111, 395 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d
Dep't 1977). The supreme court in Ninesling spoke of permanent detrimental harm,
Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 7810-77, at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nas-
sau County, Nov. 28, 1977), while the court of appeals spoke of detrimental impact.
Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386 N.E.2d 235,
239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978). It is uncertain whether these are qualitatively differ-
ent standards.
56. Alternatives, supra note 39, at 153-54.
57. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein] (suggesting a least detrimental alterna-
tive test); Alternatives, supra note 39, at 157 (suggesting a psychological best interests
test).
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Despite these criticisms of the doctrine and its application, how-
ever, the best interests of the child is the standard that has been
employed in adjudications of custody in New York."'
As a corollary to the best interests test, New York courts
apply a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to the
natural parent is in the best interests of the child. 9 The pre-
sumption might be viewed as a vestige of the "parental right"
doctrine.60 This presumption also imparts some objectivity and
certainty to the subjective and uncertain best interests stan-
dard.61 In addition, the presumption accords with current psy-
chological theory s and reinforces the positive societal values of
58. See, e.g., Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 386
N.E.2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1978); Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977); Cusano v. Leone, 43 N.Y.2d 665, 371 N.E.2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 21
(1977); Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324
N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971); In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959); Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949). But see Con-
vent of the Sisters of Mercy v. Barbieri, 200 Misc. 112, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1950) (child removed from boarding home to preserve usefulness of foster care
program although, on the record, best interests of the child would be served by permit-
ting her to remain where she was). Cf. note 52 supra (need to "trigger" best interests test
in custody contest involving a natural parent). See generally Note, Constitutional Pro-
tection of Long-Term Foster Families, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1191, 1193-94 (1979).
59. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324
N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971); In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959). Cf. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821 (1976) (natural mother has right to custody except in extraordinary circumstances).
The presumption is eliminated by statute when the child has been surrendered for adop-
tion. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(5) (McKinney 1976). See generally Alternatives,
supra note 39, at 154 n. 18.
60. Cf. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 555 n. 2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 286 n. 2, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821, 830 n. 2 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring) (burden of proof favoring cus-
tody of natural parents has the same result as treating child as chattel of the parents);
Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 145, 152 P.2d 999, 1000 (1944) (Schauer, J., dissenting)
(natural parental presumption treats child as chattel and makes property interest of par-
ent paramount to best interests of child). See also notes 37-38 and accompanying text
supra.
The presumption may also be viewed as a vestige of the right of the parent under
natural law. Cf. Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 582, 136 N.E.2d 866, 870, 154
N.Y.S.2d 903, 908 (1956) (parent's right is fundamental and derived from natural law).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized, absent a powerful countervailing in-
terest, a natural parent's constitutionally protected right to custody of his child. Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
61. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
62. At least theoretically, the blood ties between natural parent and child will even-
tually result in a love that is deeper than the love developed between foster or adoptive
parent and child because of the realities of conception and birth, the confirmation of the
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family privacy and autonomy.63 To rebut this presumption in
favor of the natural parent and succeed in winning custody, an
opposing party has the heavy burden of demonstrating grave
detriment to the child if he is returned to the natural parent.
4
Overcoming the presumption requires an affirmative showing of
the natural parent's unfitness, bad moral character, bad home
environment, abandonment of the child, surrender of the child
for adoption, prolonged separation from the child, or some other
extraordinary circumstance. 5 The presumption has also been
applied against foster parents and in favor of an agency that in-
tends eventually, although not immediately, to return the child
to his natural parent.6' In Ninesling, the court articulated for
the first time the required burden of proof for foster parents
seeking to win custody of a child who has been surrendered for
adoption and who will not be returned to his natural parent, a
burden which is, in the court's own words, "virtually impossible"
to satisfy. 7
parent's sexual identity, and the extension of the parent's self-love to include the child.
Such love will, in turn, result in better psychological development of the child, and,
thereby, in the realization of the best interests of the child. See Goldstein, supra note 57,
at 17 (biological parent usually credited with invariable, instinctive, positive tie to child);
Alternatives, supra note 39, at 158. This theory, however, has been strongly attacked.
See Goldstein, supra note 57, at 17 (suggesting that the incidence of infanticide, abuse,
battering, neglect, and abandonment disproves the theory and maintaining that an ab-
sent biological parent will not become a "psychological" parent); Alternatives, supra"
note 39, at 158-59. Cf. Determination, supra note 39, at 1328 (parental presumption
basically inconsistent with best interest rule).
63. Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 167, 207 (1969).
64. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 203, 274 N.E.2d 431, 435,
324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (1971).
65. Cf. In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 382, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1321, 418 N.Y.S.2d
339, 344 (1979) (in best interests to be raisbd by parents unless parents are unfit); Ben-
nett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1976)
(extraordinary circumstances trigger best interests *test); Alternatives, supra note 39, at
153. See also N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) (legislature
finds that natural parents can usually best meet a child's need for normal family life and
that natural parents are entitled to bring up their own children unless the best interests
of the child are thereby endangered; court may terminate parental rights and free desti-
tute or dependent child for adoption).
66. In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 229, 156 N.E.2d 700, 704, 183
N.Y.S.2d 65, 71 (1959). The agency stands "in a representative capacity as the protector
of Laura's mother's inchoate custodial right and the parent-child relationship which is to
become complete in the future." Id. at 229, 156 N.E.2d at 704, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
67. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 391, 386
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III. Court of Appeals Decision
In Ninesling v. Nassau County Department of Social Ser-
vices, the New York Court of Appeals noted its parens patriae
duty to award custody based on the best interests of the child.68
The court examined the burden of proof that foster parents
must meet to establish that awarding custody to them would
serve the child's best interests.e
The court first discussed the situation in which foster par-
ents seek to win custody in opposition to a natural parent:
[Under prior case law,] it is not sufficient for the foster parents to
demonstrate that they would offer the child a better home: they
have a far greater burden. To succeed, they must demonstrate
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978).
68. Id. at 382, 386 N.E.2d at 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 626. The scope of appellate review
in custody cases is restricted to a determination of whether the supreme court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law. See In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d
222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959); Mundie v. Nassau County Dep't of Social
Servs., 88 Misc. 2d 273, 387 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976); Determina-
tion, supra note 39, at 1325. But see McCanliss v. McCanliss, 255 N.Y. 456,175 N.E. 129
(1931) (Cardozo, J.) (appellate division can deal with custody question on its merits).
The Ninesling court did not discuss the scope of its review.
69. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1978).
The supreme court had stated:
The sole issue herein is whether or not it is in the best interests of Chuck to
be removed from the foster home for the purpose of placement in a proposed
adoptive home. Stated another way, will removal of Chuck from his foster home
for the purpose of placement for adoption cause permanent detrimental harm to
Chuck. The issue herein does not narrow to a determination as to whether the
present foster parents or the proposed adoptive parents are better equipped to
raise Chuck, or whether the foster parents or the proposed adoptive parents can
offer better surroundings ....
The overriding consideration is what grave psychological trauma will fall to
Chuck if he is removed from the home of the foster parents to be placed in an
adoptive home.
Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 7810-77, at 3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nassau County, Nov. 28, 1977). By examining the possibility of grave psychological
trauma, the supreme court may have been inquiring about the existence of an extraordi-
nary circumstance, and thereby employing the grave detriment standard applied in the
past in the foster parent-natural parent context. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text
supra (discussing grave detriment). Cf. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 550, 356
N.E.2d 277, 284, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1976) ("child may be so long in the custody of
the nonparent that ... the psychological trauma of removal is grave enough to threaten
destruction of the child"). The supreme court's consideration of grave psychological




that the return of the child to his or her natural parent would
result in the child's grave detriment.70
The court stated that, by analogy, foster parents must also
meet a heavy burden when they seek to win custody in opposi-
tion to a department with legal custody of a foster child surren-
dered for adoption.7 1 According to Ninesling, in this situation:
[Foster parents... must demonstrate not only that they would
make suitable adoptive parents,[721 but, rather, that they would
provide a better adoptive home [ 31 than that planned by the de-
partment or agency.[" ' ] In other words, to succeed foster parents
70. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1978).
71. Id. at 389, 386 N.E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 630-31.
72. Whether suitability is a separate element which foster parents must demon-
strate in addition to demonstrating that theirs is the "better adoptive home," or whether
suitability is a threshold issue which then becomes subsumed within the "better adoptive
home" element, is not clear. See note 73 infra (discussing better home).
73. For a discussion of the lack of opportunity or known standard for comparison in
determining the better. home whenever departmental plans are unrevealed and, perhaps,
when plans are revealed, see note 79 infra. If an actual comparison is made, the determi-
nation of the better home logically should involve a broad inquiry into the best interests
of the child. See Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 373 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168,
172 (1977) (best interests of the child is the "paramount concern in all custody mat-
ters"). Thus, the inquiry should include the particular circumstances of the child and the
qualifications of all prospective adoptive parents. Such broad interpretation of better
home is consistent with the court's "analogy" of the Ninesling situation to the foster
parent-natural parent situation. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46
N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386 N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1978). See text accompany-
ing note 71 supra. In the foster parent-natural parent situation, after the presumption
which favors the natural parent is rebutted, see notes 59-66 and accompanying text
supra, the court will broadly inquire into all relevant factors in assessing the best inter-
ests of the child. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (1976).
74. The "planned" home can be interpreted as meaning either the currently pro-
posed adoptive home or the eventually realized adoptive home. While the detrimental
impact standard explicitly requires a comparison of the foster home to some other home,
the opinion does not clearly indicate whether the other home against which the foster
home is to be measured is, in fact, the proposed adoptive home or the ultimately realized
adoptive home.
Ninesling can be interpreted as requiring a comparison to the proposed home. Fos-
ter parents must demonstrate that their home is better than that "planned" by the de-
partment. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978). By a common sense interpretation, a
currently proposed home would be a planned home.
On the other hand, Ninesling can also be interpreted as requiring a comparison to
the realized adoptive home. The court states that foster parents must prove their home
[Vol. 1:247
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must bear the burden of showing a detrimental impact upon the
child resulting from his or her removal from their foster care."'
The court indicated that this burden of detrimental impact
is lighter than the burden of grave detriment that must be met
to gain custody in opposition to natural parents.7 6 Nevertheless,
the court also indicated that a custody proceeding would not
provide an appropriate opportunity to evaluate and compare the
qualifications of foster parents and proposed adoptive parents."
better than the home of "the, as yet undetermined, parents" who the Department
"would eventually select to adopt." Id. at 390, 386 N.E.2d at 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
The court further indicates that foster parents are not likely to succeed "inasmuch as the
adoptive plan formulated by the child's legal custodian remains as yet unrealized." Id.
at 391, 386 N.E.2d at 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 631. See note 79 infra (discussing the burden
of proof of foster parents under the above alternative interpretations of planned home in
two situations: when adoptive plans are not revealed and when adoptive plans are
revealed).
75. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239-40, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978).
76. Id. at 389, 386 N.E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 631. Proving grave detriment
requires an initial showing of some "extraordinary circumstance which would drastically
affect the welfare of the child," Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 356 N.E.2d 277,
283, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1976), such as the unfitness of the natural parent or the
natural parent's prolonged separation from the child. See notes 64-66 and accompanying
text supra. Cf Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389,
386 N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978) ("not sufficient for the foster parents
to demonstrate that they would offer the child a better home"). A judicial finding of such
extraordinary circumstances will rebut the presumption that awarding custody to the
natural parent will serve the best interests of the child. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40
N.Y.2d 543, 547-48, 356 N.E.2d 277, 282-83, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 825-26 (1976). See also
notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra. Once the presumption is rebutted, the court
will examine all the circumstances affecting the child including the qualifications of the
foster and natural parents. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d at 548-52, 356 N.E.2d at
282-85, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826-29. Thus, for foster parents to win custody in the foster
parent-natural parent context, the foster parents must demonstrate grave detriment, and
this requires initial proof of some extraordinary circumstance.
Establishing detrimental impact requires proof that the foster home is a suitable
adoptive home and that the foster home is a better adoptive home than that planned by
the department. See notes 72-73 supra (discussing suitable and better home). Proof of
detrimental impact does not require proof of an extraordinary circumstance. Hence, the
articulated burden of proving detrimental impact is lighter than the burden of proving
grave detriment. In short, the court appears to be correct in stating that it is imposing a
burden, in the Ninesling context, "[iun a similar vein, although to an obviously lesser
degree." Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978). But see note 79 infra (discussing situa-
tions in which it will be impossible, as a practical matter, to prove detrimental impact).
77. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386
N.E.2d 235, 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978). See Alan D.M. v. Nassau County Dep't of
19801
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The court went on to state that proving detrimental impact
would be "virtually impossible, as a practical matter. 78 Foster
parents, in order to win custody, would have to prove that the
home they provide would better serve the child's interests than
that provided by the "as yet undetermined" parents the depart-
ment "would eventually select. 7 9
Social Servs., 58 A.D.2d 111, 395 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1977). But c. Williams v.
Windham Child Care, 55 A.D.2d 146, 147, 389 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (1st Dep't 1976) (al-
though court refused to determine eligibility to adopt on writ of habeas corpus, court
stated, in dictum, that in an appropriate case its role as parens patriae would permit it
to cut through "procedural thickets" for the best interests of child).
78. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 391, 386
N.E.2d 235, 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978).
79. Id. at 390, 386 N.E.2d at 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 631. During.custody proceedings,
adoptive plans may be revealed or unrevealed. The adoptive plans in Ninesling were
unrevealed, although nowhere in its opinion does the court of appeals state this fact. See
note 7 supra. Ninesling requires either a comparison of the foster home with the pro-
posed adoptive home or with the eventually realized adoptive home. See note 74 supra
(discussing these alternative interpretations of planned home). If adoptive plans are not
revealed, as in Ninesling, either comparison will impose an impossible burden of proof
on foster parents unless they qualify for a statutory adoption preference. See note 82
and accompanying text infra (discussing the preference).
Ninesling can reasonably be interpreted as requiring a comparison with the realized
adoptive home. Adoptive plans may be changed prior to adoption; therefore, the identity
of the realized adoptive home cannot be known until an actual adoption occurs. Whether
the proposed home will become the realized home also cannot be known prior to adop-
tion. Thus, under this interpretation, it is immaterial whether adoptive plans are unre-
vealed, as in Ninesling, or whether plans are revealed. In either situation, at the time of
the custody proceeding, foster parents do not know the identity of the realized adoptive
home. They could succeed against this unknown home only by proving their own home
better than any possible adoptive home the department might choose, a practical impos-
sibility unless the foster parents qualify for a statutory adoption preference. See note 82
infra.
Alternatively, Ninesling can be interpreted as requiring a comparison with the pro-
posed, rather than the realized, adoptive home. See note 74 supra. If the proposed adop-
tive plan were not revealed, as in Ninesling, and if comparison with the proposed home
were required, foster parents would again have to prove their superiority to an unknown.
As a practical matter, foster parents could only succeed in winning custody by qualifying
for a statutory adoption preference.
If the proposed adoptive plan were revealed, and if comparison with the proposed,
as opposed to the realized, home were required, the opinion does not clearly indicate
whether the foster parents would be permitted to make this comparison and thereby
meet their burden of proof. Ninesling indicates that, in custody proceedings, the qualifi-
cations of proposed adoptive parents are not at issue and foster parents "have no me-
dium" in which to prove their home better. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social
Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386 N.E.2d 235, 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978). Thus,
even if the identity of the proposed home were both relevant and known, an opportunity
to make the comparison might be lacking. This interpretation would again present foster
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The court stated that the "inherent difficulty" of proving
that a child's best interests would be served by awarding cus-
tody to the foster parents is "tempered" by the "legislative rec-
ognition that at the expiration of an extended period of foster
care the [Department's adoptive plan]. . loses something of its
prima facie validity as an expression of the best interests of the
child."80 Pursuant to statute, foster parents who had continu-
ously cared for a child for a period of at least two years could
apply to adopt the child and would receive a preference over
other adoption applicants.81
Although the Nineslings had, at the time of the court of ap-
peals decision, cared for Chuck for more than two years, the
court refused to apply the statutory adoption preference.s The
court noted that only four months had elapsed when the
Nineslings first received notification of removal and that their
own actions had caused the subsequent delay.8 The court indi-
cated that a contrary decision would encourage foster parents to
bring litigation, delay removal, and "render nugatory the two-
year custodial requirement imposed by the Legislature. ' ' 4 The
parents with an impossible burden of proof unless they qualify for a statutory adoption
preference.
Under all interpretations, if, as in Ninesling, adoptive plans are not revealed, the
court of appeals imposed an impossible burden of proof upon foster parents who do not
qualify for a statutory adoption preference. If adoptive plans are revealed, however, the
opinion does not clearly indicate whether foster parents will have either an opportunity
or a known standard for comparison; lack of either would again impose an impossible
burden upon foster parents who do not qualify for a statutory preference.
80. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978).
81. N.Y. Soc. SEtv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1976). See note 16 supra.
82. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386
N.E.2d 235, 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978). Although Ninesling was a custody, and
not an adoption, proceeding, the court specifically addressed the applicability to the
Nineslings of the statutory adoption preference. Thus, an inference can be drawn that
foster parents could use their preference eligibility in a custody proceeding to meet their
burden of proof. Moreover, the possibility that foster parents could thereby meet their
burden of proof is consistent with the court's characterization of the detrimental impact
standard as "virtually impossible," rather than as "impossible." See note 79 supra (dis-
cussing whether the burden is necessarily impossible in all situations in which the foster
parents do not qualify for the statutory preference).
83. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386
N.E.2d 235, 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978). But see note 127 and accompanying text
supra (discussing the dissenters' view on court-ordered delays).
84. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386
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court also expressed great concern that allowing foster parents
to delay would undermine the foster care system by destroying
its temporary nature, and thereby cause "a concomitant return
to institutionalized temporary care. '85 As Judge Wachtler indi-
cated in his dissent, by upholding departmental plans, Ninesling
makes it more difficult for foster parents to obtain future judi-
cial stays and to delay removal of a foster child."
When the court began its determination of the child's best
interests, it noted that "the nature and function of foster care as
a program must be borne in mind. '87 In establishing the appro-
priate burden of proof, the court considered the "future viabil-
ity" of foster care.88 Finally, the' court, in summation, stressed
the danger to "continued utilization" of the foster care system if
foster parents were permitted to "frustrate" departmental
plans.89
IV. Analysis
A. Virtually Impossible Burden of Proof
Prior to Ninesling, a heavy burden of proof was imposed
upon foster parents seeking custody of a child in opposition to a
natural parent. Ninesling enunciated a new standard, detrimen-
tal impact, that applies in a foster parent-departmental contest
for custody of a surrendered child. The court of appeals noted
that this new standard imposes a virtually impossible burden of
proof on foster parents. If, as in Ninesling, adoptive plans are
not revealed, the detrimental impact standard actually places an
impossible burden of proof upon foster parents who do not qual-
ify for a statutory adoption preference. 90
The propriety of placing a heavy burden of proof on foster
parents opposing a natural parent may be questioned: a neutral
assessment of the child's best interests is thereby foreclosed; 91
N.E.2d 235, 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1978).
85. Id. at 388-89, 386 N.E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
86. Id. at 392, 386 N.E.2d at 241, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 387, 386 N.E.2d at 238, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
88. Id. at 389, 386 N.E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
89. Id. at 390, 386 N.E.2d at 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
90. See note 79 supra.
91. See Determination, supra note 39, at 1328.
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the child is treated as a species of property in which the natural
parent has a right;92 the natural parent and the child may not
have developed a healthy psychological relationship;"3 the absent
natural parent and the child may have developed no psychologi-
cal ties at all.9 ' Further, the court of appeals recently has broad-
ened the category of circumstances which will rebut the parental
presumption," and the legislature has eliminated the parental
presumption after a child has been surrendered for adoption;",
this indicates a general trend towards circumscribing the paren-
tal presumption and requiring a neutral determination of best
interests.97 Several of the above factors suggest that it is equally
inappropriate to place a heavy burden of proof upon foster par-
ents who seek custody of a surrendered child. In this situation as
well, a neutral assessment of best interests is foreclosed; the
child is treated like a chattel; and imposing a heavy burden
seems to contradict the legislative and judicial trend towards
eliminating barriers to a neutral best interests determination.
Nevertheless, the presumption in favor of the natural par-
ent, with the corresponding heavy burden of proof placed upon
the opposing foster parents, can be justified on historical, consti-
tutional, sociological, and psychological grounds, justifications
which do not pertain to a department nor to prospective adop-
tive parents. Placing a heavy burden of proof on foster parents
opposing a natural parent is justifiable, in part, on the basis of
the historically developed common law "parental right."98 No
92. See note 60 supra.
93. Goldstein, supra note 57, at 17. Cf. M. BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION 216
(1976) (noting child abuse and battering).
94. Goldstein, supra note 57, at 17.
95. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546-47, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281-82, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821, 825 (1976).
96. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(5) (McKinney 1976).
97. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546-48, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281-83, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821, 824-26 (1976).
98. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra. Cf. In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d
374, 382, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1321, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339, 343 (1979) ("neither is the child the
property of the State").
A 1925 case, Our Lady of Victory Infant Home v. Venniro, 126 Misc. 135, 212 N.Y.S.
741 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1925), which was not cited by the Ninesling court, did
devise a doctrine of custodial "superior right". In Venniro, a habeas corpus proceeding, a
child of English-speaking background was removed from the home of Italian-speaking
foster parents and returned to the agency which was his legal custodian. The child, who
19801
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comparable common law doctrine supports the placing of a
heavy burden of proof upon foster parents if the child will not
be returned to the natural parent.
A natural parent also has rights of recognized constitutional
magnitude to the custody of his child and to the control of the
upbringing of his child." These rights cannot readily or lightly
be displaced by the state without violating the parent's Four-
teenth Amendment due process rights.100 Thus, a heavy burden
of proof when opposing a natural parent is justified and perhaps
necessary as a response to constitutional requirements. Neither
the department nor a prospective adoptive parent possesses
comparable constitutional rights, and thus, no constitutional jus-
tification supports placing a heavy burden of proof on foster
parents seeking custody of a surrendered child.
A heavy burden of proof in opposition to a natural parent
was surrendered for adoption, had been in the care of the foster parents for several
years. Since both the agency and the foster parents were proper guardians, the court
awarded custody to the agency based upon the agency's superior right as legal custodian
of the child. The court refused to assume that the child would not be properly cared for
under agency control. Moreover, the court noted that the agency's refusal to consent to
adoption by the foster parents foreclosed the development of a complete parent-child
relationship. Id. See note 129 infra (discussing adoption consent and impermanent
status).
Only in one other New York case, In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156
N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959), has "superior right" been considered in awarding
custody. In this case, however, it was expressly found that an award to the agency would
be in the best interests of the infant. Since "best interests" alone could control, any
reliance on a "superior right" theory could be viewed as dictum. Moreover, Jewish Child
Care, unlike Venniro and Ninesling, involved a child who had not been surrendered for
adoption and who would eventually be returned to her natural mother, thus buttressing
"superior right" with "parental right."
Venniro has been criticized as internally inconsistent in finding a superior right in
the agency while at the same time recognizing the inherent power of the court to deter-
mine best interests without being bound by an agency decision. Fitzsimmons v. Liuni, 51
Misc. 2d 96, 103-04, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817, 826-27 (Family Ct. Ulster County), rev'd on other
grounds, 26 A.D.2d 980, 274 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep't 1966). Moreover, performance of the
parens patriae function does not involve a determination of "rights" between parties
and is therefore inconsistent with awarding custody on the basis of "superior right." See
id. at 103-04, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817, 827; Mary I. v. Convent of Sisters of Mercy, 200 Misc.
115, 123, 104 N.Y.S.2d 939, 947 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (test of superior rights to
custody is unacceptable). See also notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
99. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213-15 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
100. See note 99 supra.
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can also be justified as a means of strengthening existing family
units, and thereby preserving both the values of family life and
the role of the family in 'society.0 1 Between surrender and adop-
tion, a child is not part of any permanent family unit. Sociologi-
cal considerations which indicate that the child should be per-
manently placed in an adoptive home and thereby become part
of a family unit 02 do not dictate which home should become the
child's adoptive home. If both the foster parents and the adop-
tive parents proposed by the department are suitable0 ' and able
to adopt, 104 no sociological justification exists for favoring those
adoptive parents initially selected by the department, nor for
placing a heavy burden of proof on the foster parents.
In addition, some psychological basis exists for a parental
presumption and thus for placing a heavy burden on foster par-
ents opposing a natural parent. Biological ties alone may result
in ties of affection and love, leading to sound psychological de-
velopment in the best interests of the child.1 05 No such positive
psychological basis supports placing a heavy burden upon foster
parents after the child has been surrendered for adoption by the
natural parent. Instead, psychological theory supports favoring
the foster parents. Strong emotional ties may have developed
during the foster relationship and the foster parents may have
become "psychological" parents to the child. 0 6 Statutory recog-
101. Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 167, 207 (1969). See J. BENNETT & M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE 545, 548-49 (1949)
("family ... [has] been traditionally considered as indispensable to the 'ongoingness' of
American society"; "from the family ... the child first acquires his place in society...
[h]is identity . .. the basic models of behavior . .. [his] values . .. [and the] concep-
tion any child has of himself"); B. BERELSON & G. STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR 313-14
(1964) ("family has. . . universal importance in human society... [and] performs ma-
jor social functions . . . [such as] child rearing ... placement [of the child] in the class
system, emotional support"); P. ROSE, THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 524 (1967) ("family is...
the primary agency of socialization . . . [and] ascribes initial status to the individual,
teaches him the basic skills, instills aspirations and sets limits upon them, and provides
him with models of performance").
102. See note 101 and accompanying text supra. Cf. R. ISAAC, ADOPTING A CHILD
TODAY 208 (1965) ("adoption provides the best way of providing love and care for the
child whose parents cannot or will not provide that love and care themselves . . . ac-
cepted pretty much without question by the social work profession").
103. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
104. See note 129 infra.
105. See note 62 supra (discussing psychological basis for parental presumption).
106. Cf. 1 J. BOwLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss 306 (1969) (role of principal attach-
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nition has been given to the strong psychological links that de-
velop when a child has remained with foster parents for over two
years, as well as to *the emotional disturbance, perhaps perma-
nent, that might occur if the child were uprooted.1 0 7 Recently,
the statutory period was reduced to eighteen months, °8 thereby
indicating legislative recognition that strong psychological bonds
develop in a relatively short period of time. The affection rela-
tionship that develops in a child's first year with his parent-sub-
stitute is believed to be the prototype for any subsequent rela-
tionships developed by that child.109 After such a relationship
ment-figure can be taken by mother-substitute); Banham, The Development of Affec-
tionate Behavior in Infancy, in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 206, 211 (1960) (affectionate at-
tachments develop towards person bringing up child); Bowlby, Child Care and the
Growth of Love, in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 155 (1960) (deprivation of mother substitute or
mother may adversely affect character development). A presumption favoring the foster
parents finds support in the proposed standards unanimously approved by the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association at their 1963 annual meeting, which in-
clude the following:
Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother whenever
such award serves the best interests of the child. Any person who has had de facto
custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper per-
son shall prima facie be entitled to an award of custody.
Standards Approved by Family Law Section, American Bar Association (1963), re-
printed in Foster & Freed, Child Custody (Part II), 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 615, 628-29
(1964).
A presumption in favor of the foster parents, however, may not be warranted be-
cause the commitment made to the child is only temporary and is more easily terminable
than is a natural or adoptive parent-child relationship. See Katz, Legal Aspects of Fos-
ter Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 286 n. 16 (1971).
107. The legislature gave a preference and first consideration in adoption to such
foster parents, N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1979-1980), see
note 28 supra, required that this preference be made a part of the contractual foster care
agreement, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(1-a) (McKinney 1976), and allowed intervention
as of right by such foster parents in any custody proceeding involving the foster child.
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1979-1980).
In urging enactment of the preference, one interested organization stated:
When a child has resided in a particular home for over 2 years, that home has
become his "Island of Security." To uproot this child, who may have had many
traumatic experiences in his past, is only increasing the possibilities of making
him permanently emotionally disturbed.
If foster families were given a preference: . . ..
4. Our community would be blessed with more children in good mental
health.
Memorandum of Adoptive Parents Committee, N.Y.S. LEGIS. ANN. 335, 336 (1969).
108. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
109. See generally Goldstein, supra note 57; M. RIBELE, THE RIGHTS OF INFANTS (2d
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has developed, the trauma of separation may be the psychologi-
cal equivalent of orphaning the child.1 0 If a heavier burden is to
be imposed, arguably, it should be placed upon the department,
rather than the foster parents.
The court cited two cases to support the detrimental impact
standard it articulated; neither case is controlling and one is
clearly distinguishable. State Department of Public Assistance
v. Pettrey,' a West Virginia case, while not controlling in New
York, does lend support to the Ninesling decision. In Pettrey,
the court awarded custody to a department as in the best inter-
ests of the child and stressed the following considerations, all of
which also apply in Ninesling: the department was entitled to
legal custody of the child; statutory requirements and contrac-
tual obligations of child custody arrangements must be upheld;
and the contesting foster parents had made no showing that the
department could not or would not provide a home for the child
equivalent to, or better than, the home that the foster parents
were then providing.
The Ninesling court also cited a Georgia case, Drummond v.
Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services,"2
which is not controlling and is clearly distinguishable. The
Drummond court held that an agency, which had legal custody
of a child and the consent of which was necessary for adoption
of the child, stood in loco parentis; had all the legal rights of
ed. 1965) (first two years generally important and fourth month crucial in early emo-
tional development); C. WENAR, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT FROM INFANCY TO ADULT-
HOOD (1971); Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love, in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, 155
(1960); Spitz, Hospitalism, 1 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 53 (1945); Spitz,
Hospitalism, 2 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 113 (1947). But see Reingold &
Bayley, The Later Effects of an Experimental Modification of Mothering, in READINGS
IN CHILD BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 86, 92 (C. Stendler ed. 2d ed. 1964) (minimizing
most effects of institutionalization during first nine months of life but noting less
verbalization).
110. See generally 2 J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1973); Goldstein, supra
note 57; C. WENAR, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT FROM INFANCY TO ADULTHOOD (1971);
Spitz, Analytic Depression, 2 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 313 (1947).
111. 141 W.Va. 719, 92 S.E.2d 917 (1956). The natural mother had, by contract and
in accordance with state law, relinquished the child for adoption. The natural mother,
who was not seeking custody herself, attempted to repudiate the relinquishment and vest
custody in the foster parents. Her attempted repudiation did not meet statutory require-
ments and, thus, was unsuccessful. Id.




natural parents, including the benefit of a prima facie right to
custody; and had absolute discretion to refuse to consent to
adoption by the foster parents.113 In Georgia, however, a best
interests standard did not control a custody award in a contest
in which a foster parent was a party; best interests only applied
to a custody contest between natural parents.11" In New York,
on the other hand, a best interests standard is applicable in all
custody adjudications. 1 5 Thus, neither Drummond nor Pettrey
is authoritative support for the Ninesling court's enunciated
detrimental impact standard.
Placing a heavy burden of proof on any foster parent seek-
ing custody of a child can be questioned as distorting the best
interests test. Nevertheless, historical, constitutional, sociologi-
cal, and psychological bases do support a heavy burden of proof
when foster parents oppose a natural parent. Neither these ba-
ses nor legal precedents, however, justify placing a heavy burden
of proof on foster parents seeking custody of a child surrendered
for adoption. Moreover, the Ninesling court actually goes be-
yond imposing an onerous burden and imposes a burden that it
describes as virtually impossible to satisfy. Thus, the effect, of
the Ninesling decision on determinations of the best interests of
a child is to accord more deference to a department than to a
natural parent. Foster parents opposing a natural parent have
an opportunity to satisfy their burden of proof because a natural
parent's identity is known, and the natural parent's qualifica-
tions can be reviewed. Foster parents seeking custody of a sur-
rendered child may have no opportunity to satisfy their burden
of proof. The identity of the planned home may be unknown; no
opportunity may exist to explore the qualifications of prospec-
tive adoptive parents; no opportunity may exist for foster par-
ents to prove that their own qualifications are superior, either in
113. Id. at 456, 228 S.E.2d at 846. The agency refused to consent to the foster par-
ents' adoption of the child, who had lived in the foster home for more than two years.
The agency gave no reason for its refusal, but racial difference between the foster par-
ents and the child was known to be a factor in the agency's decision. Id. at 458, 228
S.E.2d at 847. The court held that the foster parents had not been denied equal protec-
tion or due process and that the foster parents had no standing to contest the absolute
discretion of the agency to withhold adoption consent. Id. at 454, 228 S.E.2d at 843.
114. Id. at 451, 228 S.E.2d at 842.
115. See notes 51-58 and accompanying text supra.
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the abstract, or in terms of the needs of the particular child.116
Incomplete information compounds the difficulties of predicting
a child's best interests. 1 7 A determination without inquiry into
adoptive plans and without a fair consideration of the qualifica-
tions of the foster parents and the relationship between the fos-
ter parents and the child is based upon incomplete information
and is, in fact, no gauge of the child's best interests at all. In
addition, whenever foster parents fail to satisfy the detrimental
impact standard, the department will retain legal custody of the
surrendered child. The effect of establishing a standard which is
virtually impossible to satisfy is to make it virtually impossible
to deprive a department of legal custody. This amounts to an
extreme vote of confidence in the social services system.118
B. Refusal to Apply Statutory Preference
The court of appeals denied the Nineslings the benefit of
the statutory adoption preference.119 The court was concerned
that granting an adoption preference to foster parents who met
the two year statutory requirement only through their delay in
surrendering a foster child would encourage other foster parents
to refuse to surrender children on demand.12 0 In turn, such delay
could undermine the temporary nature of foster care and
thereby prompt a return to institutionalized temporary care.12 1
It is clear that the Nineslings had not met the two year statutory
requirement at the time either of the initial demand for return
116. See note 79 supra.
117. Cf. Cusano v. Leone, 43 N.Y.2d 665, 371 N.E.2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1977)
(court cannot decide what is best for child without sufficient information on all possible
custodians); Mnookin, Foster Care - In Whose Best Interest? in THE RIGHTS OF CHIL-
.DREN, 158, 173-85 (1974) (best interest test recognizes each child is unique; judge must
have fullest knowledge of circumstances and available alternative arrangements). But see
Convent of the Sisters of Mercy v. Barbieri, 200 Misc. 112, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1950) (agency awarded custody on record which does not indicate
whether adoptive parents selected or, if selected, their background; however, best inter-
ests standard specifically not followed).
118. The system has been criticized, and thus, such confidence may be unwarranted.
See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
119. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386
N.E.2d 235, 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 632 (1978).
120. See id. at 391-92, 386 N.E.2d at 240-41, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 632 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).




of the child or the initial judicial determinations. 12 2 Neverthe-
less, denial of the statutory adoption preference to the
Nineslings can be questioned on several grounds.
According to legislative history, enactment of the preference
had the dual purpose of benefiting both foster children and fos-
ter parents. 23 Foster children would be protected from the emo-
tional disturbance caused by uprooting, and, if adopted by the
foster parents, the children would benefit from the permanent
status of adoption.124 Judge Wachtler, in his dissent, stated that
the primary purpose of the statute is to serve the child's best
interest and that the child, who had not caused the delay,
should not be denied this benefit.
2 5
In addition, the Nineslings came within the literal language
of the statute, having "cared for a child continuously for a pe-
riod of two years or more.' 26 Their retention of the child for
over two years pursuant to court orders was legal and, as Judge
Wachtler points out, distinguishable from a situation in which
custody of a child is obtained by lawless abduction and self-
122. Id. at 390, 386 N.E.2d at 240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
123. See note 107 supra.
124. See id. Cf. notes 109-10 supra (discussing psychological impact on the child). A
1970 amendment mandated that the requirements for the statutory preference be in-
cluded in any foster parent-agency contract. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(1-a) (McKinney
1976). The purpose of this latter amendment was to inform foster parents of their rights
"so that this law can be properly implemented to the advantage of the homeless chil-
dren of this State." Memoranda of Adoptive Parents Committee, Inc., N.Y.S. LEGIs.
ANN. 31, 32 (1970) (emphasis added).
125. Ninesling v. Nassau Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 392, 386 N.E.2d 235,
241, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 632 (1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). While the United States
'Supreme Court has recognized that children have some rights of constitutional magni-
tude, see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365
(1970); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), no constitutional
argument was made in Ninesling. Neither the supreme court nor the court of appeals
addressed the possible need to appoint a "law guardian" for the child, an issue raised by
the Nineslings' attorney. Brief for Appellant on Motion for Reargument at 8, Ninesling
v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 386 N.E.2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d
626 (1978).
126. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney 1976). See note 28 supra. The statute
has been strictly interpreted. See Williams v. Windham Child Care, 55 A.D.2d 146, 389
N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dep't 1976) (alternative holding) (denying preference to married wo-
man separated from husband as not within words of statute: "any adult husband and his
adult wife and any adult unmarried person"). A similar strict but literal interpretation of
the statute would have permitted the Nineslings to claim the preference.
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help. 2 7 Thus, denial of the adoption preference can be ques-
tioned on at least two grounds: the Nineslings, having continu-
ously and legally cared for Chuck for two years, perhaps should
have been permitted to claim the benefit; and the child should
not have been denied the benefit.
C. Preservation of the Foster Care System
The Ninesling decision was actually based upon the court's
stated concern that delay in giving up a child would destroy the
temporary nature of the foster care system, thereby causing the
social service system to rely instead on institutionalized tempo-
rary care.12 The court of appeals focused on the role of the fos-
ter parents in precipitating delay. 2 9 The result of the Ninesling
127. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 392, 386
N.E.2d 235, 241, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 632 (1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Compare Nehra
v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977) (mother abducted chil-
dren, father's custody confirmed) with Golden v. Golden, 95 Misc. 2d 447, 408 N.Y.S.2d
202 (Family Ct. Rockland County 1978) (child's best interests transcend need to avoid
child snatching). See also note 129 infra (discussing court-ordered "lawful custody" as a
theoretical basis for adoption consent, a theory which could never be applied to illegally
obtained custody).
128. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1978). "Abandonment of the foster care program
with a concomitant return to institutionalized temporary care would deal a staggering
blow needlessly to children already accustomed to the taste of a bitter pill." Id.
129. Id. The impact of delay on the system must be viewed separately from the
impact of delay on the child. If the contesting foster parents were awarded custody but
remained unable to adopt, the child would be perpetually consigned to an impermanent
status. An evaluation of the best interests of the child necessarily requires consideration
of impermanent status and all that emanates therefrom, such as inability to inherit, in-
ability to ensure that foster parents will not choose to terminate the relationship, lack of
social status, and lack of psychological security. See Fitzsimmons v. Liuni, 51 Misc. 2d
96, 114, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817, 837 (Family Ct. Ulster County), rev'd on other grounds, 26
A.D.2d 980, 274 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep't 1966); In re Adoption of Runyon, 268 Cal. App.
2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Ct. App. 1969). But see Alan D.M. v. Nassau County Dep't of
Social Servs., 58 A.D.2d 111, 395 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1977) (ultimate question of
adoption need not be controlling on resolution of writ of habeas corpus; bootstrap argu-
ment that writ should be denied because department will not consent to adoption must
be rejected).
In determining the weight to be accorded impermanent status, however, the diffi-
cuty of forecasting whether consent to adopt can be obtained and the possibilities of
adoption without such consent must also be considered. The person or agency with "law-
ful" custody of the child must consent to adoption. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(d)
(McKinney 1977). To predict that the Nineslings or any other foster parents could never
receive agency consent is an uncertain proposition. This uncertainty is clearly demon-
strated by the aftermath of Ninesling: the Department reversed its position and con-
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decision will be to reduce the incentive of foster parents to seek
court-ordered stays and, thus, to reduce the probability of delay
in the future.
First, by placing a virtually impossible burden of proof on
foster parents, the court reduced the likelihood of their success
in a custody contest and, thus, reduced their incentive to contest
custody at all. Second, in determining preference eligibility, the
court refused to take cognizance of court-ordered stays. This re-
fusal will reduce the likelihood that future stays will be sought
in order to meet statutory requirements. Third, knowing that
foster parents are unlikely to succeed in contesting custody,
courts will have little basis on which to grant stays in the future.
This result, in turn, will reduce the incentive of foster parents to
seek such stays.130 Thus, Ninesling helps preserve the smooth
functioning of the foster care system.
The Ninesling court, however, did not effectively substanti-
ate the theory that delay in giving up a foster child already sur-
rendered for adoption would destroy the utility of foster care.
The court relied, perhaps incorrectly, on several cases that rec-
ognize the importance of giving deference to agency determina-
tions on removal in order to maintain an orderly and effective
foster care program."" It cited Spence-Chapin Adoption Service
sented to the Nineslings' adoption of Chuck. See N.Y. Post, Dec. 23, 1979, at 1. Agency
consent to adoption has been waived in situations in which refusal to consent was an
abuse of discretion. Alan D.M. v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 58 A.D.2d 111,
395 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1977). In addition, "lawful custody" arguably includes de
facto custody pursuant to a lawful court order. Thus, theoretically, foster parents in the
position of the Nineslings might be able to bypass the agency and consent to their own
adoption of their own foster child. Compare Mary I. v. Convent of Sisters of Mercy, 200
Misc. 115, 123, 104 N.Y.S.2d 939, 947 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (implying foster
parents with lawful custody might be able to approve adoption) with Fitzsimmons v.
Liuni, 51 Misc. 2d 96, 114, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817, 837 (Family Ct. Ulster County) (specifi-
cally questioning the implication of Mary I. and stating that consent of public welfare
commissioner is necessary for adoption), rev'd on other grounds, 26 A.D.2d 980, 274
N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep't 1966). See also Goldstein, supra note 57 (advocating "common-
law adoption"). But see In re Whitcomb, 271 A.D. 11, 61 N.Y.S.2d 1 (4th Dep't 1946) (no
jurisdictional basis for adoption order if agency did not consent); In re Adoption of Py-
ung B., 83 Misc. 2d 794, 371 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Family Ct. Onondaga County 1975) (adoption
statute created by state in derogation of common law must be strictly construed).
130. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 390, 386
N.E.2d 235, 241, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 632 (1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 388-89, 386 N.E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 630. The court cited the two
New York cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 132-35 infra. The court also
[Vol. 1:247
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/8
NINESLING V. NASSAU COUNTY19801
v. Polk3 2 which expressed concern for the future viability of the
foster care system if natural parents do not place children in fos-
ter care; if reluctant foster parents could delay giving up a child,
natural parents might anticipate difficulties in regaining custody
and choose not to place children in foster care in the first place.
In contrast, Ninesling involved delays after a child was surren-
dered for adoption, and the Ninesling decision would not affect
the return of a child to a natural parent. Delay in removing a
surrendered child has only a tangential effect on the specific
fears expressed in Spence and should not lead to avoidance of
the foster care system by natural parents. The Ninesling court
cited a second New York case, Convent of the Sisters of Mercy
v. Barbieri, s33 in which the New York Supreme Court upheld
agency plans. The Barbieri court expressed concern that the
"boarding-out" system be preserved for the benefit of "hun-
dreds, perhaps thousands, of little children.' ' 4 Although Bar-
bieri seems to support the Ninesling court's position, the Bar-
bieri court acted contrary to its parens patriae duty by
explicitly deciding against the best interests of the particular
child whose custody was being determined. 35 The Ninesling
court, on the other hand, professed to be satisfying its parens
patriae duty while preserving the foster care system.
The requirement that a child must be given up on demand
has already been diluted by various statutory provisions' s3 with-
cited cases from other jurisdictions: In re Adoption of Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 346
P.2d 672 (1959); In re Adoption of Runyon, 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Ct.
App. 1969). Some New York cases which the court failed to cite support a different posi-
tion. See Alan D.M. v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 58 A.D.2d 111, 395
N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1977) (doctrinaire or standardized approaches of placement sys-
tem must give way to more urgent needs of individual child); Mary I. v. Convent of
Sisters of Mercy, 200 Misc. 115, 104 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (system
must yield to welfare of individual child).
132. 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971).
133. 200 Misc. 112, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1950).
134. Id. at 113, 105 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
135. Id. at 113, 105 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4. "If this were an isolated instance, this court
would have no difficulty in holding that upon the record the best interests of this child
would be provided by permitting her to remain where she is." Id.
136. Prior to any removal of a child for whom they have continuously cared for a
period of eighteen months or longer, foster parents can contest an order to return the
child. Cf. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) (periodic family court
review). After eighteen months of continuous care, foster parents also have a preference
when applying for adoption. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
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out undermining the foster care system. The general fear that
additional delays would have a devastating impact is therefore
questionable. This anticipated impact is even more tenuous in
the Ninesling context, in which the child has already been sur-
rendered for adoption and the concerns of natural parents are
not involved. Moreover, if delay would undermine the system,
the legislature, which created the system, could devise corrective
measures to ensure its preservation. The court need not have
undertaken this task.
The court's stated primary obligation is to ensure that cus-
tody is awarded according to the best interests of the child.1 37
Any concern of the court to protect the foster care system is sec-
ondary to its parens patriae function. The Ninesling court ex-
pressly committed itself to awarding custody based on the best
interests of the child.38 Nevertheless, the court opportunely,
and perhaps incorrectly, foreclosed the possibility of conflict be-
tween preserving the foster care system and awarding custody
based on the best interests of the child. The court accomplished
this by requiring the Nineslings to satisfy an impossible burden
in order to demonstrate that awarding custody to them would
serve the child's best interests. Had the court not imposed this
impossible burden, an application of the best interests test
might have resulted in awarding custody to the Nineslings.'39
137. See note 51 and accompanying text supra (discussing best interests test as con-
trolling custody award).
Specific statutory enactments do not affect the parens patriae jurisdiction or func-
tion of the court. See Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). For
example, the statutes granting an agency discretionary authority to remove a foster child
will not supersede the parens patriae function of the court and prevent the court from
awarding custody in the best interests of the child, even if this award reverses an agency
determination. See Mundie v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 88 Misc. 2d 273,
279, 387 N.Y.S.2d 767, 772-73 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976). Since the court's parens
patriae function is not affected or diminished by a specific statute, it should not be
affected or diminished by enactment of a legislative scheme.
138. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 386, 386
N.E.2d 235, 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1978). Compare Convent of the Sisters of Mercy
v. Barbieri, 200 Misc. 112, 105 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1950) (interest of
particular child specifically sacrificed to preserve system for benefit of thousands of chil-
dren) with Mary I. v. Convent of Sisters of Mercy, 200 Misc. 115, 104 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1951) (system must yield to welfare of the particular child).
139. The Department had previously placed four other children in the Ninesling's
temporary care and had presented the Nineslings with an award for their services as
foster parents. See note 6 supra. The court of appeals stated that the Nineslings "appear
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V. Conclusion
Prior New York case law established that, in situations in
which a child has not been surrendered for adoption, foster par-
ents can win custody in opposition to a natural parent, agency,
or department only by showing that "grave detriment" would
result if the child were removed from the foster home. In
Ninesling v. Nassau County Department of Social Services, the
New York Court of Appeals enunciated a similar standard for
situations in which a child has been surrendered for adoption.
Foster parents, under these circumstances, can win custody in
opposition to a department only by showing that detrimental
impact would result if the child were removed from the foster
home. If adoptive plans are not revealed, as in Ninesling, this
standard requires foster parents, who do not qualify for a statu-
tory adoption preference, to prove the open-ended proposition
that their home is better than any other adoptive home the de-
partment might choose. The Ninesling court also refused to ap-
ply the statutory preference since the two year continuous care
requirement was met only because of court-ordered stays ob-
tained by the foster parents.
The decision undermines the neutral application of the
"best interests of the child" test by imposing a virtually impossi-
ble burden of proof on foster parents, a burden which is not jus-
tified by historical, constitutional, sociological, or psychological
bases, or by legal precedent. The detrimental impact standard
operates to assess, automatically and without inquiry, the best'
interests of the child in a situation in which adoptive plans are
not revealed and foster parents do not qualify for a statutory
preference. The court, professing to act in the bestinterests of
the child, in reality did not examine and may have sacrificed the
beat interests of the particular child to ensure the preservation
of the foster care system.
to be of fine character." Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d at
387, 386 N.E.2d at 239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 629. The supreme court praised the competency,
character, and integrity of the Nineslings; however, it also recognized that their ages, 52
and 53, were a valid, although not critical, factor in determining custody based on the
best interests of the child and an even more important factor in evaluating the
Nineslings as adoptive parents. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Serva., No.
7810-77, at 36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County, Nov. 28, 1977).
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